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I. Introduction
It is well known that the industrial concentration in almost all of the economic sectors of Indonesia is relatively high (see Bird, 1999) . Some sectors in the industry may have a stable and high industrial concentration because of the barriers to entry for new potential firms. The barriers may be caused by natural conditions, such as economies of scale moulded by incumbents, or formal regulations, such as exclusive monopolies, or business strategy.
One of the industry sectors with a high concentration is the food and beverages sector. Data presented by Bird (1999) showed that almost all of the subsectors of the food and beverages sector are highly concentrated. Furthermore, Bird concluded that for some of them, high concentration is particularly persistent.
The food and beverages sector contributes significantly to the Indonesian GDP. Since 2004, the output of this sector accounted for about 7% of the GDP and about 23% of the total industrial manufacturing output. This sector plays a vital role in the Indonesian economy and is a public concern, especially in fulfilling basic food needs. Furthermore, the total Indonesian population of about 206 million in 2000 indicates that this industry is an important sector. Additionally, the food and beverages sector absorbed about 23% of total employment in the Indonesian Naturally, policy makers and researchers pay considerable attention to the relationship between the degree of competition and the price markup in the food and beverages sector, mainly because high industrial concentration in the sector will lead to the extraction of consumer surplus by the firms, with consequences for the entire population, but especially for lower income households. The higher industrial concentration may induce a few dominant firms with market power to behave collusively and to generate excess profits by keeping food prices higher than in a more competitive market.
In 1999, the Indonesian Competition Law No. 5 1999 was established. This law was designed to increase effectiveness and efficiency in economic activities through the creation of fair business competition and, subsequently, to improve the people's welfare. The Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU) has been the body responsible for enforcing the law in Indonesia. Although the KPPU has limited the anti-competitive behavior of firms, the high concentration in the food and beverages sector continues to exist. Furthermore, a study investigating the competition law in Indonesia that was conducted after the competition law had been established (Pangestu, Aswicahyono, Anas, and Ardyanto, 2002) found ambiguities that are still subject to interpretation in the competition law. The ambiguities may make the investigation and the law enforcement on anti-competitive behavior ineffective.
Some previous studies, such as Hill (1987) and Bird (1999) , focused on the industrial concentration before the Indonesian Competition Law was implemented. Hill (1987) and Bird (1999) observed the industrial manufacturing concentration in Indonesia and found that the seller concentration was remarkably high. Similar research about the trend of the industrial concentration in another Asian country, Malaysia, was conducted by Bhattacharya (2002).
However, a thorough study of the trend of industrial concentration in the food and beverages sector has never been conducted in Indonesia.
As briefly explained in the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, the firms in the concentrated industry will have a better industrial performance (usually measured by profitability or price-cost margin). Some research related to the relationship between the industrial concentration and the price-cost margin has been conducted, but mostly in the U.S. and some European countries (Collins and Preston, 1966; Sizrazi, 1974; Ghosal, 1989 ; and Prince and F o r P e e r R e v i e w Thurik, 1992; Dickson, 2005) . A few studies have focused on the relationship between industrial concentration and price markup in Asian countries. Gan (1978) and Kalirajan (1993) , for example, observed that there was a positive and significant influence of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin in Malaysian manufacturing. Go, Kamerschen, and Delorme (1999) also found a positive relationship between the seller's concentration and the price-cost margin in Filipino manufacturing industries. Most of the research conducted to date investigated all subsectors of the manufacturing industry. Additionally, the research connecting the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin in the Indonesian food and beverages sector is hardly found in the published literature, nationally or internationally. The information about the relationship between the industrial concentration and the price-cost margin will provide further insight for the policy makers on whether the firms in the industry gain more producer surplus through the lessening of the competition and anti-competitive behavior in the industry.
Therefore, the investigation of the effect of industrial concentration on industrial performance has a high relevance for policy makers.
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, this paper analyzes the trend of industrial concentration in the Indonesian food and beverages sector in the period before and after the establishment of Indonesian Competition Law. The analysis of the trend includes a test for the convergence of industrial concentration in the long run. Second, this paper analyzes the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. Additionally, the effect of the competition law establishment on the price-cost margin is measured.
II. Industrial Concentration and the Price-Cost Margin
Industrial concentration is a common measure of market structure 1 . It reflects both the number and size distribution of firms in an industry. The industrial concentration may represent the market power and the probability of anti-competitive behavior among firms in the market.
The most commonly used measures of industrial concentration are the concentration ratio for n firms (CR n ) and the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), which is based on Pepall et al. (2008) . 1 We define industrial concentration as in Bain (1951) Both the CR4 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures have a limitation in the calculation, but they complement each other.
3 Hence, it is necessary to use both concentration measures to clearly picture the market structure in the industry.
Additionally, there are some shortcomings related to the calculation of the concentration ratio (CR4 and HHI). The calculation of the concentration ratio will underestimate or overestimate the "true concentration" for a series of reasons (Bird, 1999) . First, the survey of industrial manufacturing in Indonesia includes only the firms classified into large and medium firms. 4 This may overestimate the industrial concentration because small firms are not reported in the survey.
Second, BPS reports firm data based on establishment. The industrial concentration may be underestimated because the calculation may include leading firms that have more than one establishment. Third, the unavailability of information on merger activity in the data, especially about horizontal mergers, is likely to lead to an underestimation of the industrial concentration.
Fourth, because the industrial concentration may be higher in the regional than in the national level, the calculation of industrial concentration in the national level will be underestimated.
2 Considering stocks, this paper calculates industrial concentration based on sales data because sales seem to explain more about the market share than the output. 3 CR4 is commonly used to classify the market into some categories of oligopoly (see Shepherd, 1999) , but it cannot capture the distribution of the market share for all firms in the market. However, HHI can capture the distribution of the a firm's market share in a market, but it is rather difficult to classify the oligopoly categories from the HHI. In spite of this, Besanko (2004) gave a classification of market structure based on HHI. Furthermore, Liebenberg and Kamerschen (2008) also discusses the importance of using both HHI and concentration ratio. 4 BPS defines medium-sized firms as those firms employing more than 20 workers. Finally, it is noted that the industries examined may not be "markets" (see Kamerschen, 1994 for details).
The degree of the biases induced for the reasons mentioned above may not be substantial.
Bird (1999) gives some arguments in this regard. First, Hill (1990) argued that, in the aggregate, the exclusion of small firms is not a serious problem because small firms contribute no more than 15% of the total manufacturing value added in 1985. Second, different results may exist in the industrial concentration calculation between the method that uses the calculation from BPS establishment data and the one that uses the primary firm data. Although there will be differences, the industrial concentration trend may still be captured quite accurately. Third, vertical, rather than horizontal mergers, are more frequent in Indonesian economy. Therefore, the unavailability of information on merger activity will not have a great impact on the industrial concentration calculation. Finally, all factors underestimating or overestimating the concentration appear not to undermine the trend of the concentration, if their net effects remain constant over time (Bird, 1999) .
This paper also estimates the effect of industrial concentration on industrial performance measured by the price-cost margin. The relationship arises because higher industrial concentration may lead to higher industrial performance (Bain, 1951; Gupta, 1983) . A mathematical derivation of the effect of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin can be found in Saving (1970) , Cowling and Waterson (1976) , Kamerschen (2003a, 2003b) , and Kamerschen, Klein, and Porter (2005) .
Industrial performance is measured by price-cost margin (Sizrazi, 1974; Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1986; Prince and Thurik, 1992) . The price-cost margin (PCM) is calculated according to the formula proposed by Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 5 (1986) and Prince and Thurik (1992) . This formula allows for changes in inventories ( 5 Their (1988) article which has a connection to this article has been challenged by Kamerschen and Park (1993a, 1993b) . In the same year, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1993) replied that they did not view the Comment by Kamerschen and Park (1993a, 1993b) as a substantive criticism of their (1988) 
III. Data
The CR4 and HHI for the food and beverages industry are calculated using firm-level data Despite this, the number of firms had decreased significantly from 5495 to 4850 (a drop of 12%) in 1998, the year that coincided with a major economic crisis in Indonesia. Table 1 shows that the data are relatively heterogeneous, with relatively high standard deviations and coefficients of variation for all variables. In the period covered by the data, it is observed that the average of CR4 is 0.6328, which characterizes the food and beverages sector as a tight oligopoly, according to the criteria of Shepherd (1999) . It is also seen that the average HHI is 2,266, which according to Besanko (2004) , this classifies the food and beverages sector as an oligopoly. The average PCM of 0.181 also indicates that the firms in the sector have a positive price markup. Regarding all variables, the data on demand growth (Growth) and capital output ratio (COR) are very heterogeneous. 7 The heterogeneous condition of the demand growth and capital output ratio are related to the economic condition and capital-output applied by the firms, respectively.
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IV. Empirical Model and Estimation
This paper uses two econometric models to investigate the trend of industrial concentration and the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin. The first model examines the trend of industrial concentration in the industry. It measures whether there is a trend for the industrial concentration to move to a certain value. To confirm the movement of the trend of industrial concentration for all subsectors in the food and beverages sector, this paper 7 Although the data on demand growth and capital output ratio are too heterogeneous, this may not undermine the accuracy of the estimation given that these two variables appear only as instruments in the model. (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005) . affects the price-cost margin after the competition law establishment. The effect of the industrial concentration on the price cost margin may be lower after the establishment of the competition law because the law can break the cartel and other anti-competitive behavior. As a result, the competition law is also hypothesized to affect the price-cost margin indirectly through its influence on the industrial concentration. In addition, this paper also introduces trend variables and their interaction with the competition law dummy variable to see the trend of the price-cost 9 This model is different from the model used by Bird (1999) , who also investigated the trend of the industrial concentration using the models of Khemani (1980) and Brozen (1982) .
10 Derivation of this model can be found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) . 
where j and t index subsector and time, respectively. Law is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the years after the establishment of the competition law (1999), Trend = 0,1,2,…,T, and PCM is the price-cost margin.
Regarding the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin, there is an endogeneity problem in the variable of industrial concentration (Clarke and Davis, 1982; Kalirajan, 1993) . This endogeneity may arise because of the argument that the derivation of the price-cost margin comes from an equilibrium condition for profit maximization (Jacquemin et al., 1980; Kalirajan, 1993) . Additionally, Clarke and Davis (1982) established the endogeneity problem through underlying cost and demand conditions. Therefore, this paper uses some Equation (5) Based on the estimation of Eq. 4, Table 3 shows that the parameter estimate for the initial industrial concentration is negative (implying that β 1 >0), which means that there is absolute Table 4 also supports this finding. It shows that the five most concentrated industries (according to CR4) tend to change slowly over times and some of them experienced concentration reduction, such as the milk, food and wheat flour subsectors. The five least concentrated (CR4) subsectors experienced a significant increase in concentration. For three of them, the increase was larger than 15%, on average. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of Equation (5), which is estimated using a fixedeffects model with stationary level-form data. The fixed-effects model is used because the Hausman test (1978) rejected the random effects specification. Furthermore, based on the stationarity test of Levin, Lin, Chu (LLC) test (2002), the null hypothesis of non-stationary data of the CR4 and PCM is rejected at the 1% critical level, which indicates that the data at the level form are valid for use in the model.
Trends of Average Industrial Concentration
The Effect of Industrial Concentration on Price-Cost Margin
The White test for heteroscedasticity (Castilla, 2008) rejects the null hypothesis of the absence of heteroscedasticity at the 1% critical level. To address the problem of heteroscedasticity, this paper applies the generalized least square (GLS) method to estimate the model. The results in Table 5 suggest that industrial concentration has a significant effect on the price-cost margin, both for the CR4 and HHI measures. As expected, higher industrial concentration yields a higher price-cost margin for the firms. The CR4 coefficient of 0.824
indicates that the price-cost margin will increase by 0.824% following a 1% rise in industrial concentration. Additionally, the HHI coefficient of 0.091 shows that the price-cost margin will increase by 0.091 units for every 1-unit (1000) increase in HHI. Therefore, results show that firms in the food and beverages sector benefit from the oligopolistic market structure. This result is also supported by the data, given that every year, on average, the industry experienced about 18.1% of price-cost margin from 1995-2006 (see Table 1 ). The results presented here also support the findings of other studies, such as Shirazi (1974), Prince and Turik (1992), Kalirajan (1993) , Go, Kamerschen, and Delorme (1999) , and Delorme, Kamerschen, Klein, and Voeks (2002) , which found a positive impact of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin.
Furthermore, based on the estimated fixed effects of both models with CR4 and HHI, it is observed that without any influences of the industrial concentration and other variables in the model (ceteris paribus), the subsectors of the food and beverages sector have a heterogeneous price-cost margin. 13 It is also found that the subsectors that are among the least concentrated have a high price-cost margin, indicating that for these subsectors, the degree of concentration is not a very good predictor of PCM. Instead, the high price-cost margin is captured in the model by the fixed-effects, 14 which is not surprising because fixed effects parameters do not take into account some unobserved heterogeneities, such as different characteristics of the industry and scale effect. The averages for CR4 and HHI are 0.633 and 2,266, respectively, and the average trend is 5.5.
The net effects of the law on PCM are calculated as -0.014 and -0.075 for the CR4 and HHI models, respectively. The results regarding the Law variable suggest that the Competition law has affected price-cost margin in various ways. First, the parameters associated with the interaction term of Law and the concentration ratios (CR4 and HHI) show that the policy has had a more negative effect on the price cost margins of subsectors that were characterized by higher concentration ratios, which implies that the policy has been targeted more toward sectors with a high price cost margin. Second, the parameters of the interaction terms of Law and trend (-0.031 and -0.049) (almost) offset the positive single trend term, which suggests that the policy was successful in stopping the upward trend in price cost margins before 1999.
Regarding the results on the relationship between the law establishment and the price-cost margin, a number of comments are in order. First, the competition policy may not have been applied effectively to reduce market power. McCloughan et al. (2007) argues that only an effective competition policy would decrease the price-cost margin. Additionally, Pangestu et al. (2002) found ambiguities that are still subject to interpretation in the Indonesian competition law, which may make the investigation and the law enforcement on anti-competitive behavior ineffective. Second, the political stability and improved economic environment in [2004] [2005] [2006] may have resulted in higher profits, thereby confounding the effects of the competition law. Table 2 show that the price- 15 We slightly abuse notation here. Although we use the partial derivative sign, we evaluate the effect of the competition law as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. (Looi Kee and Hoekman, 2003) , which may result in higher price cost margins. Indeed, since 1999, the variety of products has been significantly increasing in Indonesia. Fourth, the increase of the industrial concentration for subsectors with low industrial concentration in the initial year may cause the increase of the price-cost margin, on average (as predicted by the model of absolute convergence in Equation (4)). This finding is in line with the finding that the competition law affected the subsectors with high industrial concentration ratios more seriously. Finally, although there are some factors that may cause the elevation of the price-cost margin, this result may give a further recommendation for an improvement in the competition law in the industry.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the trend and convergence of industrial concentration in the Indonesian food and beverages sector. Moreover, it has analyzed the relationship between the industrial concentration and the price-cost margin. This paper contributes to the literature by applying the concept of convergence to the analysis of the trend in industrial concentration.
Furthermore, this paper contributes an analysis of the relationship between market structure and industrial performance in the food and beverages sector in Indonesia.
The results show that the industrial concentration of the subsectors in the food and beverages sector tend to be slightly lower in the long run, but the subsectors of the industry still have a high industrial concentration (tight oligopoly structure) in the period covered by the data. In addition, results show that the industrial concentration converges to the same value for all subsectors.
Finally, as expected, the industrial concentration is found to have a positive effect on the pricecost margin.
The competition law has been relatively more successful in reducing the price-cost margin in subsectors that are characterized by a relatively high industrial concentration. Furthermore, the law has almost stopped the upward trend in price-cost margins that existed before the implementation of the law. Nevertheless, the price-cost margin is still higher after the competition law establishment than before, which suggests that a further improvement of the competition law is warranted. The results of this paper demonstrate that higher concentration in a subsector leads to a higher price-cost margin. One way to lower anti-competitive behavior is to eliminate barriers to entry, which effectively lowers concentration. However, the results presented here suggest that the effect of the competition law on the price-cost margin is through the concentration. More precisely, the competition law lowers the effect of concentration on the price-cost margin by breaking cartels.
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